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NOTES
STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS: A
FEDERAL QUESTION?
It has been suggested by Mr. Jus.tice Jackson that- without the share-
holders' derivative action there would be little practical check on the
derelictions of corporate management.1 Although far from adequate,
this is the only available judicial remedy 2 for the protection of the rights
of minority3 stockholders; and more important, the only effective method
of deterring would-be malefactors. The task of reconciling the rights
of investors ,ith the broad scope of managerial discretion asserted by
corporate directors has vexed courts and legislatures alike in their efforts
to circumscribe the proper limits of derivative actions.
Corporate indignation over the widespread resort to derivative suits
for extortionate purposes has been a persistent factor promoting legis-
lative and judicial limitations which have, in many cases, reduced the
remedy to near impotence. The past decade produced frequent criticisms
of this impairment of one of the few remaining means of assuring
management responsibility; yet, of the numerous remedial proposals,
none has achieved a satisfactory solution. Growth in the size of corpo-
rations, separation of ownership and control, and failure of the states
adequately to cope with ensuing maladjustments render the inability of
stockholders to protect their interests from abuses of corporation man-
agement a matter of national importance. Since there is scant likelihood
that the states can be induced to act in unison to render the remedy a
more effective one, Congress 4 is the only instrumentality capable of insti-
tuting the needed comprehensive reform. The recent equivocal legis-
lative innovation embodied in Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act5
suggests, as yet unexplored, perspectives in federal jurisdiction which may
1. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
2. The SEC may institute actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48
STAT. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78 p (b) (1946), and the Investment Companies Act of 1935, 50
STAT. 826, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-25 (c) (1946). The pressure of public opinion may in itself
dissuade directors from wrongful acts. Many states have imposed civil and even criminal
sanctions against certain forms of mismanagement. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-251,
25-252 (Bihrns Repl. 1948).
3. Derivative suits have been employed by stockholders of wholly owned corpora-
tions to prevent malfeasance by those whom they have placed in power. See Randall v.
Dudley, 111 Mich. 437, 69 N.W. 729 (1897) ; Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20, 20 N.W.
667 (1884).
4. See Hornstein, The Future Of Corporate Control, 63 HARv. L. Rv. 476, 481
(1950), suggesting that relief might be made available through Congress by authorizing
suits in the federal courts by stockholders of corporations whose securities had been
sold in interstate commerce. Recommended, as an alternative, is the formation of an
administrative agency to investigate and punish cases of corporate mismanagement.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. 1951).
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offer a new approach to the shareholder's dilemma. Remedial Jegislation
may assume either of the following forms: (1) creation of a federal
forum in which stockholders' derivative suits may be initiated without
diversity of citizenship; (2) establishment of substartive standards of
conduct for directors and definition of shareholders' rights, either ex-
plicitly detailed by Congress or reserved for judicial delineation.
A cursory examination of the numerous attempts to limit derivative
actions will reveal the success achieved in enabling directors to sub-
ordinate investors' interests without fear of accountability. Since 1944,
when New York enacted its "security for expenses" statute,0 such suits
have become practically extinct 7 in this and other states adopting similar
restrictive legislation." The Supreme Court has indicated that these pro-
6. The New York Security for Expenses Act, provides: "In an action instituted
or maintained in the right of any foreign or domestic corporation by the holder or
holders of less than five per centum of the outstanding shares of any class of such
corporation's stock or voting trust certificates, unless the share . . . have a market value
in excess of fifty thousand dollars, the corporation in whose right such action is
brought shall be entitled . . . to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, which may be incurred by it in
connection with such action . . . to which the corporation shall have recourse in such
amount as the court having jurisdiction shall determine upon the termination of such
action. The amount of the security may thereafter from time to time be increased or de-
creased in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction .... " N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw
§ 61-b.
7. In the two and one-half years following the adoption of the New York "security
for expenses" statute only four shareholders' actions involving widely-held corporations
were instituted in the Superior Court of New York county, as compared with an annual
average of over fifty a year in the preceding decade. The N. Y. STATE CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHoLDERs' DERIVATIVE SUITS 3 (1944).
For other examples of decreasing use of these actions see Hornstein, New-Aspects of
Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1947); Hornstein, The Future of
Corporate Control, 63 HARv. L. REv. 476 (1950).
8. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61-b; N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:3-15 (Cum. Supp. 1948);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (Purdon, 1945). To the same effect, but excluding
attorney's fees from the expenses for which security must be given, see MD. ANN. CODE
GEN. LAWs art. 16, § 195 (Cum. Supp. 1947). The Wisconsin statute provides that no
derivative suit shall be maintained against directors or officers of a Wisconsin corpora-
tion by holders of less than five per cent of "any" class, "unless the action is one based
on conduct which results, and is willfully intended to result, in direct or indirect per-
sonal benefit or advantage to one or more directors or officers, or conduct which results
in a personal benefit or advantage to one or more stockholders over the other stock-
holders." Wis. STAT. § 180.13 (1947). This unique statute is criticized in Note, [1948]
Wis. L. REv. 580. The California act eliminates some of the inferior features of the New
York type statute and provides for a preliminary inquiry to determine whether mainten-
ance of the suit is likely to be advantageous or detrimental to the corporation. The court
then establishes the nature and amount of security to be furnished by the plaintiff for
litigation expenses. Cal. Stat. 1949, c. 499. For a thorough discussion of the California
statute see Ballentine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far Is California's
New 'Security For Expenses' Act Sound Regulation, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 399 (1949).
See generally Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockhdlders' Derivative Suits, 47 COL. L. REv.
1 (1947) ; Hornstein, Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32
CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944) ; Bpwes, Shoulk New York's Security For Expenses Act Be
Amended, 2 SYRACUsE L. REV. 37 (1950).
NOTES
visions are of such consequence that they must be applied by the federal
courts in diversity cases.0 New York legislation, calculated to undermine
shareholders' remedies, was sponsored by an organization fronting for
conservative corporation and financial interests. 10 The same group"- has
urged outright abandonment of derivative actions.'
2
A further obstacle to such actions is the prerequisite that the plain-
tiff must have been a shareholder at the time of the questioned trans-
action or have acquired his stock thereafter by operation of law." While
most jurisdictions permit suits by equitable owners, at least one state has
provided that the plaintiff must be a registered holder. 1 4 Frequently, the
shareholder's right to assert the corporate cause of action will have
vanished prior to his discovery of the malfeasance, as a result of the
company's failure to prosecute, or suppression of facts indicative of
misconduct, until the period of limitations has expired. The harshness
of this result is intensified by legislative catering to corporate interests
through reduction of the statutory period.' 5
9. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the Supreme
Court held the New Jersey "Security for Expenses" statute constitutional. Further, it
was held to be not merely procedural and, hence, applicable in the federal courts under
the Erie doctrine.
10. "The N.Y. State Chamber of Commerce, to which you credit this action is
not in fact a state chamber of commerce. It is strictly a New York [city) organization
composed very largely of the extremely conservative corporation and financial interests
of that city." Communication from the Springfield (Ill.) Chamber of Commerce to
the Editor, Forbes Magazine, May 15, 1944, p. 10. See Hornstein, New Aspects of
Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 Cor. L. REv. 1 (1947).
11. Brief of N.Y. State Chamber of Commerce as amicus curiae, p. 25, Shielcrawt
v. Moffett, 294 N.Y. 180,.61 N.E.2d 435 (1945), discussed in Hornstein, New Aspects
of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1947).
12. In advocating elimination of these suits, such groups may unwittingly be
acting to their own detriment; if the derivative suit and hence, most of the protection
for the corporate investor should be eliminated, the desire to invest may also disappear.
This, of course, would have no immediate effect on the investing public; it might,
however, have some future influence on the ability of certain corporations to obtain
share capital. Local, unlisted concerns might be forced to look other than to the
general public for capital sources.
13. N.Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW §61; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). It is still unde-
termined whether 23(b) is substantive or procedural, and hence whether it would be
applied in federal diversity suits. For a complete discussion of 23(b), see 3 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTIcE 1 23.01 (3) (2d ed. 1948).
14. Cal. Stat. 1949, c. 499, Corp. Code § 834(a) (1). While, generally the Cali-
fornia statute is less harsh than most "security for expenses" acts, in providing that the
plaintiff must be .a "registered shareholder", it has introduced a disqualification going
beyond other restrictive legislation. In most jurisdictions it is sufficient that the
plaintiff be an equitable shareholder or unregistered owner.
15. Until 1937 the prevailing belief was that New York stockholders' suits, being
in equity, were subject only to the ten year period of limitations with a possible extension
if actual fraud were the basis and were undiscovered within the original period. In
1937, however, the Court of Appeals in Potter v. Walker, 276 N.Y. 15, 11 N.E.2d 335
(1937), held that under certain circumstances the applicable period was ten years, and
in other instances only six. After conflicting applications of the new rule in the lower
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A Massachusetts decision 6 suggests a further contrivance to defeat
the rights of minority shareholders. In that case the right to sue was
subjected to defeasance by majority vote. While the court required that
the disqualifying majority be an independent, disinterested one, acting
reasonably and, in good faith, nonetheless, such a decision seems to invite
collusion between majority shareholders and erring directors.1 7 The
proffered justification for requiring the plaintiff to seek redress through
a stockholders' meeting is to encourage internal settlement of corporate
problems. This reason actually obtains in relatively few cases. The com-
plexity of the question, practical difficulty of securing presence of a
majority, and expense and delay entailed, all suggest that such an appeal
is an inconvenient and unwarranted qualification of the plaintiff's
prerogative.
Perhaps the greatest impediment to the bringing of derivative suits
is the difficulty of obtaining jurisdiction in a state court over defaulting
directors. Membership on the directorate of the large corporation is
dispersed throughout the United States, with attendant infrequency of
meetings and delegation to executive committees. Yet, such absentee di-
rectors cannot so facilely transfer responsibility for conduct of the com-
pany's affairs. Hence, they are necessary parties defendant in a share-
holder's suit against corporate management, with the result that service
of process is an insuperable barrier to challenging aberrations of the
board of directors in state courts. The defender of investors' interests,
thus, may turn to the federal courts where he is confronted at the thresh-
old not only with an identical service of process obstacle, but in addition,
courts, the New York Law Revision Commission, in 1942, recommended statutory
clarification.
Instead of alleviating the situation, the Legislature reduced the period from "ten
and six" to "six and three" years respectively, although not a single witnesg at the
hearing on the legislation publicly recommended this reduction. Minutes of Public
Hearing Before the Joint Legislative Coimnittee on the Judiciary, Feb. 18, 1942. The
period is now six years .if the action is for an accounting or if based on fraud. Pre-
sumably the statute runs from the date of the fraud and not its discovery, and three
years if the action is "for waste or for an injury to property or for an accounting in
connection therewith." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT, § 48, subd. 8; Id. § 49 subd. 7. See Horn-
stein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COL. L. Ray. 1, 5 (1947);
House, Early Exoneration for Delinquent Directors In New York, 46 COL. L. RE. 377
(1946).
16. S. Solomont & Sons Trust Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 93
N.E.2d 341 (Mass. 1950), noted in 49 MIcH. L. Rav. 898 (1950); 35 MINx. L. REV.
407 (1950) ; 39 CALIF. L. Rrx. 268 (1951).
17. The court's conclusion in the Solontont case is unique. It is a decision which,
if followed without careful scrutiny of the facts (as to who composes the "independent
disinterested majority" and whether they were acting "reasonably and in good faith")
may lead to complete annihilation of minority suits.
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NOTES
with the necessity of establishing the requisite diversity.18 Since the
corporate defendant is considered an indispensable party'" and frequently
is domiciled in the same jurisdiction as the plaintiff, complete diversity 20
often is lacking.2
1
While diversity of citizenship and service of process are still sine
qua lion, realignment of parties, once a critical problem, is no longer of
major significance; most federal courts have refused to realign, when to
do'so would defeat their jurisdiction. 22 Likewise,,venue and formn non
conveniens, once formidable barriers, have been greatly diminished by
the Revision Act of 1948.23 An action no longer need be~dismissed for
improper venue or an inconvenient forum, provided there is a district
18. 62 STAT. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. 1951) provides that "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum of $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and is between: (1) Citizens
of different States ... " 
19. Parties have been classified as formal, necessary, and indispensable. The
classification is important in determining what parties may or must be present in a
particular case and, especially in federal courts, in deciding questions of jurisdiction
and venue. The classic American statement of the rule as to indispensability was made
in Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130 (U.S. 1854): "Persons [are indispensable] who
not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a
final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the con-
troversy in such condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with
equity and good conscience." See generally, 3 MooRE's FEDERAL. PRACTICE 19.02 (2d ed.
1948).
20, Diverse citizenship as a basis for federal jurisdiction must exist between all
plaintiffs on one hand and all defendants on the other when suit is instituted. Osthaus
v. Button, 70 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1947); Layering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F.2d
(2d Cir. 1932), af'd, 289 U.S. 103 (1933) ; Strawbridge v. Curtis, 3 Cranch 267 (U.S.
1806).
21. An early technique of insuring federal jurisdiction was to arrange for suit
against the corporation by a nonresident stockholder, or to have shares transferred to
a nonresident who would, upon formal refusal of the board of directors to act, bring
an action in the federal court. This practice was properly condemned as an imposition
upon federal jurisdiction. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
This led to adoption of Equity Rule 94 -by the Supreme Court, which was designed
to guard against any type of collusive suit. The rule later appeared as Federal Equity
Rule 27, now Federal Rule 23 (b). It is specifically limited to stockholder suits which
are derivative in nature. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
Under Rule 23(b) the plaintiff-shareholder must allege under oath thaf (1) he was a
stockholder at the time the transaction took place, or that his share has since devolved
upon him by operation of law; and (2) the action is not a collusive one. The latter pro-
vision is a mere formality since the adoption of the "collusive" provision in the
Revision Act of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (Supp. 1951) which provides: "A district
court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or
otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction
of such court."
22. For a discussion and collection of cases, see 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
123.21(1) (2d ed. 1948).
23. 62 STAT. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (Supp. 1951).
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or division in which suit could have been properly initiated. In this case
the action is 'transferred where timely objection is made.24
Proposals to alleviate'the hardships consequent upon the increasing
ineffectiveness of the derivative action have been numerous, albeit pro-
ductive of little improvement. Solutions advocated range from measures
entailing only slight modification by individual states of their existing
regulations to complete nationalization of the corporate enterprise. For
example, one writer 25 recommends an integration of the more desirable
features embodied in the derivative action provisions of several juris-
dictions. This plan would comprehend elimination of private settle-
ments ;26 enactment of the California "security for expenses" statute pro-
viding for preliminary hearing on the necessity of depositing security,
rather than the New York arbitrary per cent or dollar requirement; and
codification of the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Clarke V.
Greenberg,2 7 which held that the plaintiff's recovery is received in a
fiduciary capacity for the benefit of the corporation. While commendably
attempting to eliminate strike suits without also sterilizing the remedy,
this arrangement presupposes the impossible-unanimity of state cor-"
rective endeavors. 28
Illustrative of the more far-reaching methods of projected corporate
reform are the recurrent O'Mahoney federal incorporation bills29 and a
scheme for obtaining "responsible capitalism" through creation of a na-
tional management group, responsive to the public will, to supervise
affairs of the country's 200 foremost concerns.30 Senator O'Mahoney's
24. See 63 STAT. 101, 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (Supp. 1951), recognizing that improper
venue may be waived. See also, 62 STAT. 937, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Supp. 1951), per-
mitting 'transfer to a more convenient district or division that is proper.
25. BOWES, Should Neu, York's Security For Expenses Act Be Amended, 2
SYRACUSE L. REv. 37, 52 (1950).
26. Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stipulates that, "A class
action shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court.
27. 226 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
28. To be effective state remedies must be uniform in their elimination of restrictive
rules now existing in the various jurisdictions. The very states in which most corporations
are organized have been most lax in adopting measures for corporate reform. The
reason, of course, is the increased revenue attendant upon the entry of new corporations.
29. In August, 1936, Senator O'Mahoney suggested his first corporate licensing
bill, and in January, 1937 introduced his now famous SEN. 10, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937). This bill was designed to regulate interstate and foreign commerce by
prescribing the conditions under which corporations may engage or may be formed to
engage in such commerce. In 1949, after inactivity during the war years, he introduced
a bill providing "for the issuance of certificates of statutory compliance with certain
national standards to certain corporations, trade associations, and labor organizations
engaged in or affecting commerce." SEN. 10, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). For a
complete history of the O'Mahoney proposals and other views on federal incorporation,
see REUSCHLEIN, SCHOOLS OF CORPORATE REFORM (1950).
30. The 200 would no longer be regarded as private business, but as public
institutions. Their management would not be responsible to the stockholders alone, but
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persistence appears fruitless. Emphasizing the improbability of adoption
of the second plan is the author's concession that its success depends on
a thoroughgoing reorganization of the administrative branch. 31
The strength of federal proposals for needed redress or deterrence
of corporate abuse lies in their proponents' recognition that adequate
relief cannot be secured on a piece-meal basis. Their weakness is at-
tributable to universal failure, prior to enactment of Section 301, to
perceive the possibility of purely non-substantive federal measures. Sec-
tion 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act 32 provides that suits may be instituted
in the federal district courts, without regard to diversity or the amount
in controversy, by employers or labor unions. This provision fails to
create, specifically, any substantive rights. It is undetermined 3 whether
state law is to be applied to suits in the federal courts for breach of
collective bargaining agreements, or whether the federal tribunals are
to all the people. , The objective would be a smoothly running economy. Mr. Fischer
points out that such a concept need not involve public ownership; that on the contrary,
its aim would be to avoid wholesale nationalization. Fischer, The Lost Liberals, 194
HARPERS 385 (1947).
31. There have been suggested numerous other proposals, both to strengthen de-
rivative actions and to abolish them in favor of substitutes. E.g., In Douglas, Directors
Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1305 (1934), the author advocates that private
agencies be established to prosecute and investigate charges of the complaining share-
holders. Similarly, public agencies might be used for the same purpose along with
further utilization of the administrative process. Berlack, Stockholders Suits': A Pos-
sible Substitute, 35 MIcH. L. REv. 597 (1937). In Pound, Visitatorial Jurisdiction Over
Corporations in Equity, 49 HARv. L. REv. 369, 395 (1936), it is contemplated that the
derivative suit could be supplanted by more frequent application of the visitatorial
powers of equity through information by the attorney general. It has also been sug-
gested that more frequent use of the "death sentence" found in judicial winding up
proceedings might be possible. Hornstein, A Remedy For Corporate Abuse-Judicial
Power to Wind Up A Corporation At The Suit of A Minwrity Stockholder, 40 COL.
L. R-v. 220 (1940). In Washington, Stockholders' Derivative Suits: The Company's
Role, and A Suggestion, 25 CORNErL L.Q. 361 (1940), the author states that a "judicial
department" might be created within the corporation, including perhaps a lawyer, an
accountant and one of the directors, all chosen by the stockholders. A further proposal
would employ a federal administrative agency as a possible forum for the redress of
wrongs against stockholders-the ICC or SEC could be given quasi-judicial functions
to pass on claims of mismanagement. Hornstein, A New Forum For Stockholders, 45
COL. L. REv. 35 (1945). Yet another suggestion would empower a federal agency
endowed with investigatory authority to license corporations. Those not licensed would
continue to use the equitable remedy; those that were would first be required to appeal
to the agency. Stocker, The Derivative Suit: Its Limitations and A Suggestion, 29
Gao. L.J. 363 (1940).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (Supp. 1951) provides: "Suits for violations of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce ... or between any such labor organizations may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
Section (b) stipulates that any such labor organization shall be bound by the acts
of its agents, and may sue or be sued as an entity.
33. The question of the construction of Section 301 has not been settled by the
Supreme Court.
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to devise their own substantive principles. If Congress intended only to
remedy a jurisdictional or procedural defect arising from the fact that
in s6me states a labor union could not sue or be sued, then perhaps a
state cause of action is involved and the Act merely furnished a federal
forum. Several decisions have attributed this purpose to Section 301. 3 4
If this construction is endorsed by the Supreme Court, the power of
Congress to superimpose uniform procedures upon state substantive
regulatory measures by providing that they be enforced by the federal
judiciary will be established.3.5
This innovation suggested by Section 301 would permit deference
to the state's prerogative to regulate corporations, an area in which it
has traditionally been unchallenged, 36 and yet dispose of numerous im-
pediments to the shareholder's suit. Creation of a national forum for
derivative actions would enable the shareholder to sue in the federal
courts regardless of diversity. The process dilemma could be avoided
by instituting nation-wide service.37 Thus, when a dissatisfied investor
feels that gross negligence or fraudulent conduct of directors is sub-
verting the company's interests, a ready means is presented of cir-
cumventing procedural pitfalls to a stockholder's suit.
Section 301, viewed as a jurisdictional matter, presents constitu-
tional issues identical to those inherent in the creation of a forum in
which to bring shareholders' derivative actions. In either case the
logical constitutional basis for such a broad grant of jurisdiction is the
arising muder provision of Article III, Section 2, which indicates the
34. In Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers of America, 167 F.2d 183,
(4th Cir. 1948), it was held that the provision permitting suits in federal courts by
or against labor organizations as entities. was designed to emphasize their capacity to
enter or be brought into courts as parties, and not to enlarge the class of cases of
which district courts were given jurisdiction. While in Bonner Mfg. Co. v. United
Furniture Workers of America, 90 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. N.Y. 1950), the court in com-
paring section 301 with section 303 (the latter section specifically including substantive
provisions) indicates that 301 merely creates a forum. It was necessary in 301 to
expressly eliminate the diversity requirement in an action under. that section, while it
was not necessary to do so in 303 since it includes substantive rights. The case of
Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Ind. Dist. Lodge, 91 F. Supp. 596 (Wash.
1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1951), involved the question whether there had
been a recision, by the plaintiff, of 'the collective-bargaining agreement existing between
the plaintiff-employer and defendant-union. The court held, applying the Erie rule, that
under the law of the state there was a recision by the plaintiff precluding a suit for
damages.
35. It seems likely that prior to this time, this had never been done. Section 301
is unique in its complete omission of federal substantive provisions.
36. Such a proposal undoubtedly would be more politically expedient.
37. FED. R. Civ. P., 4(f) permits nation-wide service of process if the federal
statute involved so provides. See, e.g., the Federal Interpleader Act, 63 STAT. 105 (1948),
28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1950).
NOTES
source and perhaps 38 limitations of jurisdiction which Congress may
confer on the federal courts. The question is thus a novel one of consti-
tutional authority-whether the section is sufficiently broad to sanction
a statute which merely grants jurisdiction. It has been asserted that
Section 301, under this construction, is unconstitutional because: "Back
of all such grants [statutes conferring federal question jurisdiction]
must lie a cause of action in federal law: to wit a statute creating sub-
stantive rights which may be asserted in the federal court. Thus, in the
Osborn case, the omnipresent bank charter imbued all the Bank's trans-
actions with a federal -nature.' '39  Under such an interpretation of
Osborn,40 that case held the Constitutional verbiage, "arising under the
laws of the United States," to mean arising under only those laws
creating federal substantive rights.41
In other writings discussing the meaning to be accorded to arising
under the controversy has centered around the identical statutory lan-
guage in the Act of 1875.42 Essentially, the disagreement concerns the
necessity of a substantial controversy or real dispute involving the fed-
eral law in question. Beginning in 1877 with Gold-Washing & Water
Co. v. Keyes, 43 the courts have consistently held that a suit does not arise
under federal law within the meaning of the statutory jurisdictional grant
unless it is precipitated by a controversy between the parties concerning
the effect of the federal act upon the facts involved. Justice Cardozo's
language in Gully v. First National Bank44 is the focal point of the
argument: "A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws
of the United States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one
arising under those laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really and
substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity,
construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the
result depends." Professor Forrester has insisted that, in the light of
Gully and Osborn, the statutory'arisin under should be interpreted as
38. The conflict in the Supreme Court in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tide-
water Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), was whether Article III, section 2 of the
Constitution was controlling as to the types of "cases and controversies" enumerated
.therein, and hence whether it was a limiting section. See note 54 infra.
39. Note, Section 301(A) Of The Taft-Hartley Act: A Constitutional Problem
Of Federal Jurisdiction, 57 YAlE L.j. 630 (1948). The writer recognizes, however, that
Section 301 may constitutionally be upheld as a statute intended to include substantive
rights, such being enunciated by the federal courts.
40. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 264 (U.S. 1821).
41. The Osborn decision was prior to any legislative enactment incorporating the
"arising under" phrase, and was therefore only interpretative of the constitution.
42. Presently 36 STAT. 1091, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940).
43. 96 U.S. 199 (1877).
44. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
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broadly as its constitutional counterpart, 45 which, he contended, does
not require a "real dispute" concerning the federal law. However, in a
later commentary,46 the same author apparently recedes from this view
and intimates that only the constitutional arising under is to be accorded
the broader construction.
From the Gully language it can be inferred that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the constitutional arising tnder is more narrow than
that which Professor ,Forrester imputed to the Osborn decision. 47 Messrs.
Chadburn and Levin evidently concur in Cardozo's view equating the
constitutional arising tinder with the real dispute theory.-IS The basic
differences in point of view revealed by the comments on arising under
herein discussed are illustrative of the writings on this aspect of federal
jurisdiction. However, they fail to advance the present inquiry into the
constitutionality of a Congressional attempt to invoke federal ques-
tion jurisdiction in the absence of a federal law creating substantive
rights. This question is an entirely unprecedented one which manifestly
should not be governed by gratuitous language in existing cases con-
struing arising uitder in an entirely different context.49  Nothing short
of mechanical jurisprudence could justify reliance on the Gold-Washing
-Gully line of authority to defeat achievement of a legitimate national
aim which Congress seeks to accomplish by means of such a grant of
45. Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdiction And Section 5, 18 TULANE L. REV.
263, 288 (1943): "If . . .it is felt that such words give the federal courts jurisdiction
over more cases than they can properly handle, the solution is not to be found in
misreading the law, as was done ... recently in the Gully case, but in passing a new
statute with words that actually do limit the amount of federal question jurisdiction
granted to the trial courts.
"Insofar as the clause' in the Constitution is concerned, the generous rule of the
Osborn case, although in need of restatement for clarity, should be retained. The con-
stitutional source of judicial power should be broad in order to take care of the
unknown and uncertain needs of the future."
46. Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROa. 114 (1948).
47. Both Prof. Forrester and Messrs. Chadburn and Levin agree that this may be
implied from the Gully decision. Forrester, The Nature Of A Federal Question, 16
TULANE L. REV. 362, 370 (1942) ; Chadburn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction Of Federal
Questions, 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 639, 651 (1942).
48. It must be remembered that the "arising under" decisions have always been
interpretative of federal statutes embracing substantive rights.
49. It is a familiar principle that the statutory meaning of a term may be more
restricted than its constitutional interpretation. .Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425
(1918) ; Lamar v. United States,; 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916). See also Treines v. Sun-
shine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939), where the possibility of different statutory and
constitutional meanings are discussed; and Note, 32 MINN. L. Rav. 818 (1948). Indeed,
Mr. Justice Rutledge has pointed out that the mere identity of words in the Constitution
and in the statutes purporting to effectuate constitutional powers is no guarantee that
constitutional and statutory words mean-or indeed, were ever intended to mean-the
same thing. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582,
615 (1949).
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jurisdiction. The only considerations relevant to the constitutional issues
pertain to those fundamental policies, embodied in Article III, which
underlie the permissible scope of federal jurisdiction.5
National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.51 makes
tenable the view that creation of a federal forum might be upheld under
Article I powers. There the court upheld the constitutionality of a stat-
ute treating the District of Columbia as a state for purposes of diversity.
Justices Jackson, Burton and Black declined to overrule Hepburn and
Dundas v. Elizey52 which held that the District is not a state within the
mekning of Article III. Instead, Article I power to legislate for the
District was said to empower Congress to open the federal courts any-
where to its citizens. The remaining Justices, both concurring and dis-
senting, vigorously rejected the Article I rationale.53 Acceptance of
Justice Jackson's position would produce a radical modification in the
traditional appraisal of Congress' power to impart jurisdiction to the
district courts. He would place no further qualification upon permissible
grants of jurisdiction than the restriction to "cases and controversies" and
rejects any limitation to thoge particular types specifically enumerated in'
Article III.54 While the Article I argument expounded in this case may
not immediately gain the approval of those justices as yet uncommitted to
this theory, it can not be discounted as a basis for upholding future
50. It has been suggested that the Constitution confers on the courts power to
disregard prior cases where a question of constitutionality is involved. The Constitution
embodies the conflicting ideals of the community and no one can authoritatively say
what these ideals mean. The court should not be able to binid itself in such a matter,
and there should always be available an appeal to the Constitution. Levi, An Intro-
duction To Legal Reasoning, 15 U. OF CIl. L. REv. 501, 541 (1948). As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has observed, ". . . the ultimate touchstone of constitutipnality is the Con-
stitution itself and not what we have said about it... ." See Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939) (concurring opinion).
51. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
52. 2 "Cranch 445 (U.S. 1805). Chief Justice Marshall ruled that the general
diversity jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not embrace citizens of
the District of Columbia within the term "citizen of a state."
53. The concurring opinion of the late Mr. justice Rutledge, for himself and
Justice Murphy, took issue with the Article I argument and held the Act constitu-
tional only after overruling Marshall's decision in the Hepburn case. The minority,
in two dissents, one by Mr. Justice Frankfurter for himself and Justice Reed, and the
other by the Chief Justice, concurred in by Mr. Justice Douglas, disagreed sharply
with the Article I theory, but like Justices Jackson, Black and Burton, upheld the
sanctity of the Hepburn opinion.
54. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590,
591 (1949). It is at this view that most of the objections of the Jackson opinion have
been directed. See Comment, 48 MIcHr. L. REv. 999, 1005 (1950) in which it is pointed
out, "The establishment of inferior tribunals under specific Article I power' to create
them has always been assumed to be subject to the limitations of Article III." See also,
Note, The Tidewater Case And Limited Jurisdiction of Federal "Constitutional" Courts,
3 VAxD. L. REv. 271, 273 (1950).
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broad grants of jurisdiction where no single view is strong enough to
gain support of an outright majority. 55
Creation of a federal forum for the litigation of a state derivative
action would enable a dissident shareholder to circumvent some of the
procedural legerdemain formerly impeding recourse to legal remedies,
yet patently falls short of removing all the defects with which such suits
presently are encumbered. The latter is emphasized by the tendency of
the courts to classify as substantive an increasing number of state law
questions formerly regarded as procedural. 56 Hence, it would not be
amiss to examine the possibility of including in this innovation a degree
of federal substantive regulation of derivative actions.
Again the judicial fortunes of Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act are pertinent. While this provision fails to expressly enunciate
standards, some courts have taken the position Congress intended to
create a federal cause of action,57 leaving to the judiciary the task of
55. A tribunal reluctant to countenance mere establishment of a federal forum,
yet cognizant of the numerous weighty considerations supporting the Constitutionality of
such a bestowal of federal question jurisdiction, perhaps might evade the apparent
consequences of confirming the legislative action by resort to the procedure employed in
Bell v . Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). This was a civil action predicated solely on the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in which the plaintiff sought to recover damages
against an FBI agent for injuries allegedly sustained as a consequence of an illegal
search and seizure. The Supreme Court decided the district court had jurisdiction to
inquire whether there was a federal cause of action. On remand, the lower tribunal
dismissed on the ground that the Amendments supplying the jurisdiction failed to
include remedial provisions, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947). Congress could
effectively prevent such evasive tactics by stipulating that state law has been adopted,
and for the purposes of derivative actions shall be accorded the same treatment as federal
legislation.
This in itself might be a sufficient peg on which to hang the constitutionality of
such a proposal. An express provision that state law is to be applied could be con-
strued as Congressional adoption of the state law, the federal statute then comprising
the sole basis of the cause of action. Such an interpretation would, in effect, allow
the federal statute to be treated as one including both procedural and substantive
principles.
56. See note 9 supra; Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.
530 (1949) (holding the Kansas Statute of Limitations applicable in a suit brought in
the federal district court).
57. See Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers of America, 83 F. Supp.
162 (S.D. N.Y. 1949). In Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, 182
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950), suit had been filed for damages resulting from a work stoppage
induced by the defendant in violation of a provision in the collective bargaining agree-
ment requiring arbitration previous to a cessation of work. It was held that the district
court had jurisdiction under 301 and further that 301 created substantive remedies where
none existed before. Under New York law, it was necessary for plaintiff to show bad
faith and the defendant contended that this had to be shown in the federal court But the
right was said to create no requirement of bad faith, therefore, state law was not
relevant. This case was followed in Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F.
Supp. 278 (S.D. N.Y. 1951), where 301 was held to create a new, federal substantive
right. However, this court went one step further, declaring that Congress had clearly
pre-empted the field in this area. Such a conclusion does not necessarily follow
from the mere creation of substantive rights, as the court seemed to indicate. Rather
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,working out in detail a federal decisional law of collective bargaining
agreements.5 s If these cases are correct, Congress has for the first time
merely indicated an appropriate area of federal regulation, leaving en-
tirely to the courts the function of implementing this policy through a
case-by-case delineation of the governing criteria.5 9 Federal regulation
than being exclusive, such rights properly would co-exist with state law in the absence of
clear Congressional intention to the contrary or conflict with state rules..
The problem of pre-emption would also exist in creation of federal substantive
rights for stockholders' derivative suits, See Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945);
Note, Occupation of The Field It Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-1946; Ten Years of
Federalism, 60 HARV. L. Rxv. 262 (1946). In Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951), Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, stated:
"It is clear from these decisions that the States are not precluded from enacting laws
on labor relations merely because Congress has-to use the conventional phrase-entered
'the field. It is equally clear that the boundaries within which a state may act are de-
termined by the terrain and not by abstract projection." Id. at 403.
A federal statute governing stockholders' derivative suits might properly be de-
clared exclusive, since Congress has authority to attach that label to any law. For
example, see United States Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1940), which provides
that federal power over federal licensing in that area shall be exclusive. However, Con-
gress has occasionally made specific provision that its pronouncements on a subject shall
not foreclose state regulation. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1940);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77bb (1940).
58. Wallace, The Contract Cause of Action Under The Taft-Hartley Act, 16
BROOKLYN L. RaV. 1, 16 (1949), suggests.: ". ... it may be inferred that Congress intended
to leave it to the courts to work out the nature and detail of the substantive right by
developing a 'national law' or 'federal common law' of collective-bargaining agreements.
This would be a more charitable interpretation, than to assume either that the Con-
gressional draftsmen did not understand the implications of what they did, or that they
were inept." That substantive rights may have been intended is also recognized in,
Note, Section 301(A) Of The Taft-Hartley Act: A Constitutional Problem Of Federal
Jurisdiction, 57 YALE L.J. 629, 635 (1948) ; but compare Forrester, The Jurisdiction Of
Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAW & CONTEXP. PRoB. 114 (1948), where the
author apparently fails to detect any such design in the Congressional enactment of
Section 301.
59. Justice Brandeis' statement in the Erie case that there is no federal common
law must not be read out of context; that principle is applicable only in diversity cases.
He conceded that local law was to apply except in federal question cases. Erie v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1937). There is, of course, a federal common law. On
the same day that Erie was decided, Justice Brandeis also delivered the opinion of the
Court in Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Company, 304 U.S. 92,
110 (1937), in which he stated that the apportionment of the water of an interstate
stream is "a question of 'federal common law,' which neither the 'statutes nor the
decisions of either State can be conclusive."
There are areas where it is necessary for federal courts to carve out federal common
law because state law has no application. E.g. (1) where an interest of the United
States is involved; United States v. Standard Oil of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947),
recognized a right in the United States to recover medical expenses incurred in caring
for a soldier injured through the negligence of the defendant, although there existed
previously no such cause of action; Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S., 318 U.S. 363 (1943),
held that the United States could recover payment made on a forged check-"In the
absence of an-applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the
.governing rule of law according to their own standards." See also, Board of County
Commissioners v. U.S., 308 U.S. 343 (1939) (right of the U.S. to recover interest on
taxes illegally collected by local government from an Indian); Girard Trust Co. v.
United States, 149 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1945) (right of U.S. as lesseq of property);
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of derivative actions might perhaps be cast in the image of Section 301,
as construed in these cases. While-little motivation, other than political
expediency, can be perceived for enacting remedial measures in this form,
if Congress is so inclined, an unequivocal indication that federal prin-
-ciples are to govern is essential. Otherwise the same confusion which
enshrouds Section 301 would result. A less specious approach would
require Congress to specifically evolve substantive rules governing con-
duct of corporate directors, providing remedies for breach of such duties.
Either alternative is likely to incur the criticism of opponents of federal
expansion as a usurpation of functions within the province of state
regulation.60
One possible solution to the perplexities surrounding derivative
actions entails combining certain aspects of each of the alternatives thus
far discussed. Congress could provide a federal forum for shareholders'
suits, thereby precluding existing procedural difficulties, while expressly
indicating that state law is to apply, except in specified situations where
certain rules have adversely affected investors. The instances in which
state law could be supplanted by federal regulation might include statutes
of limitations, security for expenses statutes, and majority shareholder
defeasance of an investor's right to sue. By adoption of such a hybrid
program, many obstacles to redress of flagrant impositions upon stock-
holders' interests might be averted without incurring the disapprobation
usually accompanying federal intervention in matters regarded as pe-
culiarly of local concern.
Eisenhart, Federal Decisional Law Independent of State Common Law Since Erie v.
Tompkins, 9 GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 465 (1941) ;
(2) because of the sweep of a federal statute; D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.LC., 315
U.S. 447 (1942), determined that liability on a note given a bank is a federal question
under the Federal Reserve Act, when the bank is insured by the FDIC. In Vanston
Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946), the court decided that
whether a bondholder may be paid interest on interest after default is a federal question
when presented in a bankruptcy case. See also, Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392
(1946) (liability of shareholders of joint stock land bank is not governed by state law) ;
American Surety Co. v. Bethlehem National Bank, 314 U.S. 314 (1941) (effect of
illegal pledge of asiets of national bank is a federal question); Dietrick v. Greaney,
309 U.S. 190 (1940) (defense to a note given a national bank in contravention of policy
of National Banking Act .is question of federal law) ;
(3) because Congress has occupied the field; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric
Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942), held that in the field of patents, federal policy is supreme
and state rules do not govern estoppel of a license to challenge a patent's validity. In
O'Brien v. Western Union, 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940), the court declared that in an
action against a telegraph company for libel, federal law governs because the telegraph
companies are subject to extensive federal legislation.
60. These would be subject to the same objections leveled against such proposals
as federal incorporation, federal licensing and Mr. Fischer's proposal for federal super-
vision of the "200." See notes 29 and 30 supra.
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Another deficiency in the derivative action, even where readily
accessible, is the lack of stringency in the sanctions imposed. If this
device is to benefit any but the few investors financially able to prosecute
such litigation, its chief value must be as a deterrent. Federal legislation
may be the most appropriate instrumentality for transforming the deriva-
tive suit into an effective potential threat to instill greater responsibility
in corporate management. In a case of serious corruption, Congress could
empower a court of equity to remove the offending director; 61 double
or treble damages might be assessed against directors and officers guilty
of fraudulent misconduct. 62 In extreme cases, where the fraud has been
so pervasive as to seriously impair the company's going concern value,
the judicial power to wind up the corporation might be invoked by the
shareholder. 63
If shareholders must continue to place reliance in the derivative suit
as their chief bulwark against mismanagement, this remedy must be
greatly improved to render it adequate to the function it is designed to
perform. Sinc6 the states have so manifestly failed to accomplish the
needed adjustment between managerial discretion and responsibility, fed-
eral intervention is not only warranted but imperative. Perhaps the
suggested compromise between states' rights and the national interests
in the welfare of investors will render such intervention less repugnant.
TERMINATING CONDITIONS UNLIMITED IN TIME
While public planning has replaced individual freedom in the
allocation and utilization of resources in many areas of the economy,
land use in the United States remains primarily subject to private con-
61. The SEC is permitted under the Investment Companies Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-35 (1946), upon showing gross misconduct or abuse of trust, to obtain an injunction
against any officer, director, member of advisory board, investment advisor, depositor.
etc., from continuing to so act, either permanently or for such period as the court, in its
discretion, shall deem appropriate. The SEC might also be used as an advisory body to
the judiciary in derivative action cases.
62. E.g,, Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1951) (double
damages, plus attorney's fees and costs); Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.
APP. § 1895 (Supp. 1951) (treble damages, plus attorney's fees and costs).
63. The average stockholder does not desire liquidation, as he is likely to receive
more for his stock on the market than by dissolution. For a complete discussion of the
judicial power to wind up a corporation see Hornstein, A Remedy For Corporate
Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up A Corporation at the Suit of a Mhnority Stock-
holder, 40 COL. L. REv. 220 (1940); REUSCHLEIN, SCHOOLS OF CORPORATE REFORm 151
et seq. (1950).
